

Address by Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director of Central Intelligence
Congressional Summer Interns
Coolidge Auditorium
Washington, D.C.
1300, Wednesday, 27 June 1979

CONGRESSIONAL SUMMER INTERNS

1. Information--you can't operate without it
 - one reason you're here--to learn how Congress runs
 - but acquiring it easy--all available--you just dig it out
2. Same for President, Cabinet, Congress
 - need info to operate
 - often available--but just as often not--many nations closed
 - ° wheat steal
 - ° cheat on SALT (couldn't have treaty at all)
3. IC job to get info government needs to carry out its policies intelligently--make sound decisions
 - what's IC?
 - ° all intel gathering and intel analyzing departments of USG
 - e.g., State - diplomatic
 - Defense - military
 - Energy - energy related
 - FBI - foreign spies in U.S.
 - CIA - political, economic, military
 - ° how collect?
 1. Technical -
 - burgeoning

STAT

2. Human - the spy

- no less important than technical
- intentions, plans

3. Big job today - dovetail, integrate

- very expensive - risks
- want no gaps or too many overlaps

° other half of intel - analyze

- research - like university
- put pieces together
- never have whole picture - depend on experience,
trends, changes from which deductions can be made
- want divergent views

° CIA

° State

° Defense

4. How stack up with Soviets?

- ° HUMINT - smaller but better - scalpel vs. meat cleaver
approach
- ° Technical - clearly more advanced
- ° Analysis - open vs. closed society

Intend keep that way

5. Big issues today for intel

- ° Charters - 1947 out of date
 - must balance rights/freedoms vs. need for information
 - can't shackle IC if want info
 - owe it to IC to tell what want them to do/don't want them to do
- ° Anticipate trouble spots - further down stream - alert President, Congress to trends

6. One of biggest success stories of past few years - success of Oversight
- 2 special committees
 - good relations - both ways
 - candid - testify personally often
 - accountability benefit
 - guidance helpful
 - guarantee intel activities in full conformance with laws/standards of U.S.

Address by Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director of Central Intelligence
VADM William Read Retirement Ceremony
Norfolk, Virginia
Saturday, 30 June 1979

At the turn of this century, the American philosopher, William James, said,

"The world is only beginning to see that the wealth of a nation consists more than anything else in the number of superior men that it harbors."

It is to the credit of the U.S. Navy that it has harbored Bill Read, a most superior man, for these past 30 years.

I have known Bill Read for most of those years. (Personal anecdote) I believe Bill exemplifies those rare qualities which we try to nurture in our newest officers and which we look for in all officers. One of the most important being to have the intellectual capacity to think imaginatively.

I happen to believe that the naval profession is as intellectually demanding as any I know of today. That is why young officers should seek to emulate Bill Read--to follow in his footsteps of not just embracing the past--old ideas, outmoded concepts, comfortable fallacies.

In the field of tactics Bill Read has blazed new trails. His reorganization...has stimulated emphasis on the tactical side of our responsibilities. It may sound odd to some to say that we need intellects like Bill to develop our tactics. Even many of us in the naval profession

still conceive of tactics as primarily matters of bravery and command decisions. We do not think often of the increasing intellectual content of tactical decisionmaking. And yet, look at just one example.

The skipper of a major combatant ship like this today will find that his fighting capability is largely resident in his computer program. The program limits the captain's options no matter how brave or ingenious he may be. If the captain does not understand the assumptions, the limitations that some civilian put into those programs, he may find that in the moment of battle what he wants to do simply cannot be done.

During the Vietnam war we sent guided missile cruisers to the Gulf of Tonkin. In their computer programs was the means to control the missile system to protect a carrier task force--assumed to be in the open, blue reaches of the ocean--against air attack. Instead, those cruisers hugged the North Vietnamese coast and attempted to control the air space over the land. Few, if any, skippers realized that their missile control program was not built for that and that when the lights lit up and said, "free to fire," it was not so. The missile envelope over land is markedly different than over water. Today we must be able intellectually to understand all the details and capabilities of our weapons systems and sensors to get the most out of them. That's what it takes to be a good tactician; that is exactly what Bill has encouraged in the Surface Force Atlantic.

Managerial decisions in our Navy also require more intellectual strength than we often acknowledge. Bill and I once.... How, for example, do you compare the alternatives of whether a new ship should have one propeller or two? Common sense tells any ship driver that he would prefer two. It is better for maneuvering, it gives redundancy, and you can go faster. But, how much are those characteristics worth in dollars? Why do you need to maneuver much at sea today when you have long-range weapons? Is redundancy really important? Are you likely to have battle damage that will put out one screw and not damage enough else of the ship to disable it? Perhaps. And speed. It is always nice to be able to go faster. Even if you have long-range weapons, maybe speed will get you where you ought to be in the nick of time. But what if you could have 12 one-shaft ships instead of 8 two-shaft ships for the same price? Isn't there a reasonable probability you might be in the right place in the first instance anyway?

These are difficult tradeoffs. But even more difficult is the intellectual process of displaying the alternatives on issues like this in ways that will be fair and clear, and will truly assist decisionmakers in considering their options. Does the staff work that is being done encourage and facilitate this ability to judge alternatives? The general answer is no. One of the greatest farces that has been perpetrated on the US military is the concept of completed staff work. Completed staff work is really a way of eliminating the manager from the decision process by giving him only one choice. Rather than laying out issues and discussing all reasonable options, "completed staff work" often attempts to drive a decisionmaker to a particular decision.

The third element of being a naval professional is to be a strategist; and Bill Read has excelled here indeed. Strategic decisionmaking is also much more intellectual today. Why do we need a Navy at all? We all know why. Alfred Thayer Mahan told us we needed to control the seas and gave us a prescription for doing it. It amounted to having the best battle fleet around and being able to destroy the enemy's battle fleet in head-to-head engagement. In fact, not long after Mahan wrote, he was hopelessly outdated first by the advent of the submarine and then the aircraft. But despite this, all navies prepared for World War I in the image of Mahan by building large battle fleets. And, in that war there was a head-to-head engagement, as Mahan predicted, the Battle of Jutland. It decided nothing. The war was being decided out on the sea lanes of the North Atlantic between the U-boats and the convoys.

Despite these lessons of World War I, generations of naval officers continued to point to Mahan as the ultimate strategist. In the disarmament conferences of the 1920s, they focused on the battleships and overlooked the submarine. In preparation for World War II they refought the Battle of Jutland. The potential of the submarine was ignored and the aircraft carrier was looked on as an adjunct for the battleship. And again, of course, World War II proved that Mahan was wrong.

Because of the lack of successors to Mahan; because we have failed to rise to the intellectual challenge before us; even today we lack a coherent, relevant philosophy of naval strategy--of naval warfare. This

is not unrelated to the fact that in the last decade the United States Navy has decreased from 1,000 to 460 ships and is only buying enough today to sustain a navy of about 330.

Why am I saying this at a retirement ceremony? Because today the Navy is losing a man who understands these issues. He has made a significant contribution. Young officers and enlisted men and women who are here must understand them also and take up the baton to act on them as has this superlative officer and exemplar.

Bill, you have been an inspiration to all of us. From those who truly care about the Navy, we thank you for your ideas, your direction, your courage.

Marty - helpmate - navy wife - your sacrifices have made those contributions possible.

I wish both all happiness.

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